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Abstract
We study the problem of incentivizing reliable
demand-response in modern electricity grids. Each
agent is uncertain about her future ability to reduce
demand and unreliable. Agents who choose to par-
ticipate in a demand-response scheme may be paid
when they respond and penalized otherwise. The
goal is to reliably achieve a demand reduction tar-
get while selecting a minimal set of agents from
those willing to participate. We design incentive-
aligned, direct and indirect mechanisms. The direct
mechanism elicits both response probabilities and
costs, while the indirect mechanism elicits willing-
ness to accept a penalty in the case of non-response.
We benchmark against a spot auction, in which
demand reduction is purchased from agents when
needed. Both the direct and indirect mechanisms
achieve the reliability target in a dominant-strategy
equilibrium, select a small number of agents to pre-
pare, and do so at low cost and with much lower
variance in payments than the spot auction.
1 Introduction
A crucial aspect of operating an electric power system is that
an exact balance between supply and demand must be main-
tained at all times. Electricity grids are facing a number
of new challenges in this regard, due to both the increasing
number of intermittent renewable generation resources [Su
et al., 2014; Zhang et al., 2015], and the presence of more
volatile types of loads, such as those from electric vehicle
charging [Robu et al., 2013].
These challenges have led to an increased interest in
demand-side response (DR), in which consumers (industrial,
commercial, or domestic) commit to temporarily reduce or
shift consumption away from periods with low generation ca-
pacity [Palensky and Dietrich, 2011]. A number of DR aggre-
gation services exist to facilitate this process, and intermedi-
ate between distribution network operators (DNOs) and con-
sumers. These range from those operated directly by DNOs,
to commercial services.1
1Examples include Enernoc, Kiwi Power or Upside Energy.
We model demand response as a two-step process. First,
consumers opt-in to a DR scheme, possibly sharing informa-
tion about their cost to respond if asked, and their probability
of being able to respond. Some, perhaps all, of these con-
sumers are selected and asked to prepare for the possibility of
demand reduction. Second, in the event that a demand reduc-
tion is required, then some, perhaps all of the selected con-
sumers are asked to reduce demand, and may receive a pay-
ment or pay a penalty depend on whether or not they follow-
through and respond.
DR aggregators are not interested only in those consumers
with lowest cost, but also in consumers who are reliable,
and most likely to respond if needed. Selecting reliable con-
sumers allows a target to be met with high confidence while
asking fewer consumers to prepare, leading to less economic
disruption. It is natural that consumers will not always be able
to respond. Consider an industrial factory for example, which
uses electricity for the production line, transporting raw ma-
terials, and cooling. Its ability to respond in a DR event is
highly uncertain; e.g., it may depend on the production proce-
dure, time of day, customer requests, and weather conditions.
From a mechanism design perspective, the goal is to reli-
ably meet a target reduction while minimizing the number of
agents who are selected. There are a number of interrelated
challenges: (1) incentivize consumers to opt-in to the scheme,
(2) truthfully elicit information about reliability and cost, (3)
select a small, reliable set of agents to ask to prepare, and (4)
set up payments and penalties so that those who are selected
will choose to follow-through if asked and if able to reduce
demand. Simple approaches fail. For example, setting a high
fixed penalty for not reducing demand when asked would en-
sure follow-through, but not provide incentives for opt-in.
We advance two related designs: a direct mechanism that
elicits both costs and probabilities directly, and an indirect
mechanism that elicits only willingness to accept a penalty
in the case of non-response, from which response probabil-
ities are inferred. The mechanisms fix a payment that will
be made to agents for demand response, and select agents in
decreasing order of the maximum acceptable non-response
penalties until the reliability target is met. Both mechanisms
have a simple dominant-strategy equilibrium, meaning truth-
ful reporting in the direct mechanism and truthfully reporting
the maximum acceptable penalty in the indirect mechanism.
In an experimental evaluation with a wide range of param-
eter values, we show that the mechanisms achieve close to the
first best (i.e. assuming the mechanism knows agent types and
can choose the most reliable ones) with regard to the number
of agents who are selected and asked to prepare. We also
benchmark against a spot auction, in which demand reduc-
tion is purchased from agents when needed. The spot auction
has a higher total cost as well as a very large variance in pay-
ments, making the scheme risky for both the agents and the
grid, as well as susceptible to collusion.
1.1 Related Work
To our knowledge, this is the first application of mecha-
nism design for eliciting cost and probability information
from consumers in order to achieve reliable demand re-
sponse. A number of papers in the power systems litera-
ture discuss the use of DR aggregation [Zhang et al., 2015;
Su et al., 2014]. Although not an approach of mecha-
nism design, there is also some prior work on market de-
sign for demand response (e.g. [Li et al., 2015; Johari and
Tsitsiklis, 2011; PJM, 2015]), proposing to allow for bids
of supply or cost curves, and discussing market equilibria.
Other papers [De Vries and Heijnen, 2008; Kwag and Kim,
2014] have considered reliability in DR but from a policy
(non mechanism-design) perspective. There are also works
that design contracts for load control, aiming at for example
maximizing the system payoff while satisfying other opera-
tional constraints [Balandat et al., 2014; Haring et al., 2013;
Yang et al., 2015], but again without taking a mechanism de-
sign viewpoint. Others have proposed to use scoring rules to
incentivize truthful reports about expected future consump-
tion in power grids [Rose et al., 2012; Robu et al., 2012;
Akasiadis and Chalkiadakis, 2013], which do not apply to our
setting because they do not set penalties correctly in order to
provide incentives for follow-through if needed.
On the mechanism design side, the inspiration for our ap-
proach is the work to promote capacity utilization [Ma et al.,
2015]. In a sense, ours’ is the inverse problem where we want
to promote capacity reduction rather than utilization. An ad-
ditional, technical aspect of the present problem is to consider
the question of how to select a number of agents in order to
probabilistically meet a system reliability target.
2 The Demand Side Response
In the demand side response problem, the planner is the
electricity grid (or DR aggregator) and the agents are con-
sumers of electricity interested in offering DR services. Let
N = {1, 2, . . . n} denote the set of agents. Each agent can
prepare for demand response ahead at a cost of ci ≥ 0. We
consider the simple setting in which each agent demands the
same quantity (a single unit, w.l.o.g.). Our results easily ex-
tend to agents with heterogeneous demand sizes. If an agent
prepares to reduce demand, then she is able to reduce de-
mand with probability pi ∈ (0, 1), at the cost of vi ≥ 0. The
amount vi represents the opportunity cost for the loss of elec-
tricity. The triple θi = (vi, pi, ci) defines an agent’s type, and
is agent i’s private information. Let θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) denote
a type profile. We assume that the agents’ abilities to respond
are independent to each other. In our model, an agent can
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Figure 1: The timeline of a two-period mechanism.
only respond if she first prepares.2
Reliability Target. Denote M ∈ N+ as the target capacity
reduction that needs to be achieved. The designer’s objective
is to select a minimal set of agents to prepare for DR ahead of
time such that the target reduction is met with probability at
least τ , where τ ∈ (0, 1) is a system-wide reliability target.
We make a deep market assumption, which is that there are
enough agents in the economy that it is possible to meet the
reliability target. This holds for most real DR markets.
Example 1. Suppose target M = 1 and probability τ = 0.9,
and there are three agents with p1 = 0.8, p2 = 0.6, and
p3 = 0.4. If only agent 1 prepares, 1 unit of power is provided
with probability 0.8 < τ thus the reliability target is not met.
If both agents 1 and 2 prepare, the probability with which no
one is able to respond is (1− p1)(1− p2) = 0.08 < 1− τ =
0.1, and the reliability requirement is met.
Two-Period Mechanism. We consider mechanisms that
run over two time periods which use a fixed reward R > 0
and a variable penalty per agent. The timeline is as follows
(see Figure 1):
Period 0:
• Agents can choose to report information to the mech-
anism, with knowledge of their type and the demand-
response reward R.
• The mechanism determines for each selected agent i the
period-one penalty ti ≥ 0 in case of non-response.
• With the knowledge of ti and R, each selected agent
decides whether to prepare for demand response.
Period 1:
• If agent i can respond (with probability pi) she decides
whether or not to do so with the knowledge of ti and R.
• For selected agent i, the mechanism pays R upon re-
sponse, and charges ti ≥ 0, otherwise.
Note that neither the selected agents’ choice on preparation
or their ability to respond are observable.
The structure of the design is well motivated, representing
a small change from the current practice by DNOs and aggre-
gators. In current practice, as in our model, selected agents do
not receive a payment when asked to prepare, and the amount
of payment made to an agent in the event of demand response
is fixed. The new ingredients are that we elicit type informa-
tion in period zero, and use this both to decide who to select,
and also to set a penalty in the event of non-response.
A demand-response mechanism is dominant strategy in-
centive compatible (DSIC) if truthful reporting maximizes
2In practice, advance notification is required to perform demand
response at a reasonable cost [Borenstein et al., 2002].
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Figure 2: Expected utility as a function of the penalty ti.
each agent’s expected utility regardless of the reports of other
agents, and conditioned on the agent making rational deci-
sions in period one (see below). A demand-response mech-
anism is individually rational (IR) if each agents’ expected
utility for (truthful) participation is non-negative. Informally,
a DSIC mechanism is “truthful” and an IR mechanism en-
sures that agents will choose to participate.
Rational Decisions and Expected Utilities. How should
an agent i with type θi = (vi, pi, ci), who reports truthfully
and is selected, and now faces a reward R and penalty ti,
behave in the mechanism? Consider the following cases:
1. If the agent does not prepare, she is unable to respond and
her utility will be −ti.
2. If the agent does prepare, but is not able to or decides not
to respond in period one, her utility will be −ti − ci.
3. If the agent does prepare, and is able to respond in period
one and decides to do so, her utility is R− vi − ci.
For any agent with vi > R, her utility is negative for all
ti ≥ 0. As we will see later such agents will not be selected
by the mechanisms for DR. Assume now that R > vi. If the
agent prepares and is able to respond, then it is rational to
respond because R− vi− ci > −ti− ci. If the agent decides
to prepare, her expected utility is,
ui(R, ti) = pi(R− vi)− (1− pi)ti − ci. (1)
For (R − vi)pi − ci < 0, the expected utility, whether
preparing or not, would be negative as long as the penalty
ti ≥ 0, and she will not be selected by the mechanisms. As-
sume for now that (R − vi)pi − ci ≥ 0. Such an agent will
choose to prepare (getting u(R, ti) rather than −ti) and also
choose to respond if possible. The expected utility ui(R, ti)
decreases linearly with slope 1−pi as the penalty ti increases.
A simple example with two agents is shown in Figure 2.
Let z ≥ 0 denote the penalty that represents the unique
zero crossing point of u(R, t), such that u(R, z) = 0. This is
the maximum penalty that the agent is willing to pay:
zi =
(R− vi)pi − ci
1− pi . (2)
Fixing vi and ci, the higher the probability pi and the more
reliable the agent, the slower her expected utility ui(R, ti) de-
creases with ti, the shallower the utility curve, and the larger
the crossing point, zi. For example, agent 1 in Figure 2 has
a larger willingness to pay, although the expected reward she
gets from the grid minus her cost (the y-intercept) is lower.
3 The Direct Mechanism
We now design a truthful, direct mechanism for demand re-
sponse. The mechanism selects agents in decreasing order of
willingness to pay until the reliability target is met.
Definition 1 (The Direct Mechanism with Reward R). The
direct mechanism Mdir(R) collects reported type profile θˆ =
(θˆ1, . . . , θˆn), and computes the willingness to pay zˆi accord-
ing to (2). Assume w.l.o.g. that zˆ1 ≥ zˆ2 ≥ · · · ≥ zˆn (breaking
ties arbtirarily). Let Xi be a Bernoulli random variable with
parameter pˆi if zˆi ≥ 0 and let Xi ≡ 0 if zˆi < 0.
• Selection rule (period zero): xi(θˆ) = 1 for i ≤ m and
zˆi ≥ 0, and xi(θˆ) = 0 for i > m, where the last agent
selected is,
m = min
`∈N
` s.t. P
[∑`
i=1
Xi ≥M
]
≥ τ. (3)
• Payment rule (evaluated in period zero, payments made
in period one): make payment R to any selected agent
who reduces demand. If selected, charge agent i a
penalty amount ti(θˆ) = zˆm−i for no response, where
m−i = min6`=i
` s.t. P
 ∑
i′=1,...,`, i′ 6=i
Xi′ ≥M
 ≥ τ,
is the agent with the smallest willingness to pay that
would be selected in an economy without agent i. De-
mand reduction is not accepted from any unselected
agent, and her payment is zero.
Note: We’ve focused for clarity on describing the typical
case (given our assumption about a deep market) that (3) has
a solution, i.e. there are enough agents participating at cur-
rent reward level R. If not, the mechanism simply selects all
agents and charges no penalty.
For intuition for payments, the quantity ti(θˆ) = zˆm−i is the
minimum payment that agent i needs to be willing to accept
as penalty in order to be selected, and this is independent of
agent i’s own report.
Example 2. Suppose M = 1 needs to be reduced with prob-
ability at least τ = 0.75, and the grid pays a reward R = 6
for demand reduction. There are three agents, with types
- Agent 1: v1 = 1, p1 = 0.9, c1 = 1
- Agent 2: v2 = 1, p2 = 0.7, c2 = 1
- Agent 3: v3 = 1, p3 = 0.6, c3 = 1
For truthful reports, the zero-crossings are z1 = 35, z2 = 8.3
and z3 = 5. We first allocate to agent 1. Since P [X1 ≥M ] =
p1 > τ , agent 1 is the only agent that is selected.
In the economy without agent 1, we would first allocate
to agent 2. Since P [X2 ≥M ] = p2 < τ , allocating to
only agent 2 is not enough to satisfy the reliability require-
ment. Thus we also allocate to agent 3 and we can check
P [X2 +X3 ≥M ] > τ . Therefore, m−1 = 3, and agent 1’s
penalty is t1(θ) = zm−1 = 5 if she does not respond.
The rational decision of agent 1 is to prepare and respond
if possible, and her expected utility is u1(R, t1) = 3 > 0. It’s
easy to see that for all report θˆ1 of agent 1 s.t. zˆ1 ≥ z3, agent
1 would be selected and face the same payments since agent 2
herself cannot meet the reliability target. Making reports s.t.
zˆ1 < z3, agent 1 would not be selected thus gets utility zero.
Truthful reporting is therefore a dominant strategy. 
For each agent, the two possible alternatives under the di-
rect mechanism are that she is selected or not. Now we
show that the mechanism satisfies agent-independence and
agent maximizing, thus is DSIC [Nisan, 2007]. Agent-
independence requires that each agent faces prices for each
alternative that are independent of their own report, and agent
maximizing means that the mechanism selects the alternative
that maximizes her utility under such prices.
Theorem 1. The direct mechanism is DSIC, IR and always
meets the reliability target for a sufficiently large R.
Proof. First, note that for a selected agent the penalty ti =
zm−i and reward R are independent of θˆi. Also, there is no
payment to or from unselected agents thus payments satisfy
agent-independence.
Fix an agent i. If xi(θˆ) = 1, we know i ≤ m and
P
[∑i−1
i′=1Xi′ ≥M
]
< τ . This implies thatm−i ≥ i+1, and
thus ti = zm−i ≤ zi. Agent i’s expected utility for preparing
ui(R, ti) ≥ ui(R, zi) = 0, i.e. selecting agent i is agent-
maximizing for her, comparing with not selecting which re-
sults in utility zero. If agent i is not selected, then i > m
(as computed in (3)) or zi < 0. If zi < 0, ui(Ri, ti) < 0
for all ti ≥ 0 thus if selected agent i gets negative utility. If
i > m, m−i = m and ti = zm−i ≥ zi thus expected utility
from preparing ui(R, ti) ≤ 0. Not selecting her is agent-
maximizing, which gives her utility zero.
Combining the two cases we see that the mechanism is
DSIC. From the above argument, we also see that the ex-
pected utility for all agents are non-negative thus IR follows.
With R high enough, zi ≥ 0 for all agents i thus (3) can
be met due to the deep market assumption. It follows from
rational decisions in period one that all selected agents will
choose to prepare and then reduce demand when possible,
and that the mechanism will achieve its reliability target.
The mechanism does not necessarily select the most re-
liable agents, since the zero-crossings zi’s are not always
aligned with the pi’s, and we cannot allocate in decreasing
order of the reported pi’s while retaining incentive alignment.
3.1 Reliability Evaluation
The total quantity of demand reduction by a set S of selected
agents, X =
∑
i∈S Xi, is a Poisson-binomial distributed ran-
dom variable [Chen and Liu, 1997]. The CDF of X is
P [X ≤ k] =
k∑
`=0
∑
A∈F`
∏
i∈A
pi
∏
j∈Ac
(1− pj), (4)
where F` is the set of all subsets of S that are of cardinality
`, and Ac = S \ A. A naive way of evaluating the CDF re-
quires computing the sum of an exponential number of terms.
However, exact polynomial time algorithms based on recur-
sive methods [Radke Jr and Evanoff, 1994] or Fourier Trans-
form [Ferna´ndez and Williams, 2010] exist, and return the
CDF of a summation of a thousand random variables within
seconds. Hence, we adopt the Fourier Transform approach in
the experiments reported here.3
3The Chernoff bound [Chernoff, 1952] and other large deviation
bounds can also be used to approximate this expression, and would
4 The Indirect Mechanism
The direct mechanism asks for the full type of each agent and
computes the willingness to pay using the reported costs and
reliability. For simplicity, and also to better protect the pri-
vate cost information of participants, we introduce an indirect
mechanism, which elicits a single bid from each agent, esti-
mates the pi’s of each agent from the bid, and then evaluates
the reliability target using the estimated pi’s.
We can compute a bound on reliability pi from the willing-
ness to pay. We know from (2) that
pi =
zi + ci
zi +R− vi ≥
zi
zi +R
, (5)
where the inequality holds since ci, vi ≥ 0. Note that with
fixed R, the expression zi/(zi +R) is monotone in zi. Let bi
be agent i’s bid, and b = (b1, . . . , bn) denote a bid profile.
Definition 2 (The Indirect Mechanism with Reward R).
1. Reports: The indirect mechanism Mind(R) collects a
single bid bi from each agent, representing the maximum will-
ingness to accept a penalty in the case of non-response. As-
sume w.l.o.g. that b1 ≥ · · · ≥ bn (breaking ties arbitrarily).
2. Inference: Let p˜i = bi/(bi + R) and X˜i be a Bernoulli
random variable with parameter p˜i.
3. Outcome: The indirect mechanism determines selection
and payments as in the direct mechanism, simply replacing
Xi with X˜i and zi with bi.
Theorem 2. It is a dominant strategy for each agent to bid
b∗i = zi under the indirect mechanism. The indirect mecha-
nism is IR and meets the reliability target forR large enough.
Proof. Consider an agent with zero-crossing zi. If she bids
bi = zi and does not get selected, we know that m−i = m as
computed in (3) and i > m. Bidding lower than bm−i would
not change her utility. Bidding higher than bm−i means that
agent i would be selected and get charged bm−i > zi, thus
get negative utility in expectation.
If an agent bids bi = zi and gets selected, we know m−i >
i must hold and ti(b) ≤ zi, thus agent i gets non-negative
utility in expectation. Bidding weakly above bm−i would not
change her utility. Bidding below bm−i , the agent i would not
get selected thus would get utility zero.
Combining the above two cases, we know that it’s a dom-
inant strategy to bid b∗i = zi. Therefore under the DSE,
p˜i = b
∗
i /(b
∗
i + R) = zi/(zi + R) is a lower bound on the
reliability pi of each agent. With similar argument as in the
direct mechanism we know that selected agents always pre-
pare and choose to respond when possible, thus the reliability
requirement is always met with large enough R.
Example 2. (continued) Continuing the earlier example, in
the indirect mechanism, agents bid their willingness to pay,
b∗1 = 35, b
∗
2 = 8.3 and b
∗
3 = 5, and the estimated probabili-
ties are p˜1 = 0.85, p˜2 = 0.58, and p˜3 = 0.45. With M = 1
and τ = 0.75, it suffices to select only agent 1 since she will
respond with probability at least p˜1 = 0.85. We can check
that in the economy without agent 1, both agents 2 and 3 need
select slightly more agents than necessary but provide an easy way
of evaluating reliability while retaining truthfulness.
to be selected, thus the penalty agent 1 would be charged in
case of non-response is b3 = 5. In this case, the outcome is
the same as the outcome of the direct mechanism.
Suppose instead that τ = 0.9. Now, from the estimated
reliability, agent 1 does not appear to be sufficient to meet
the target in the indirect mechanism, even though she is ac-
tually able to meet the reliability target. In this case, the two
mechanisms would have different outcomes. 
Observe that the gap pi − p˜i is small while vi and ci are
small, since the (conservative) inference approach approxi-
mates them by adopting zero. Also, the gap is small when pi
is large, since with large pi the zero-crossing zi is high thus vi
and ci are less significant. Since we select agents in decreas-
ing order of zi, we are selecting the set of agents for which
the bounds are relatively tight.
5 A Comparison with a Spot Auction
For a simple comparison, we adopt a spot auction, where we
run an M + 1st-price auction with a reserve price r, i.e. the
reserve sets an upper bound on the reward payment. This auc-
tion is run in period one in the event that DR is required, and
without pre-selection in period zero of which agents should
invest effort and prepare. Rather, agents need to reason about
possible payments from the auction in period one in order to
decide whether to prepare in period zero.
For simplicity, we will study a complete information Nash
equilibrium of the period-zero preparation decisions under
the spot auction mechanism (i.e., assuming bidders know
each others’ values.)
Definition 3 (Spot Auction with Reserve r). The Spot Auc-
tion Spot(r) collects a single bid bi from each agent at period
one, and chooses the M lowest bidders to reduce their con-
sumption, making payment to each agent equal to the mini-
mum of the M + 1st lowest bid and the reserve price r. De-
note b = (b1, . . . , bn) as a bid profile and assume w.l.o.g. that
b1 ≤ · · · ≤ bn (breaking ties arbitrarily.)
• Allocation rule: xi(b) = 1, if i ≤M and bi ≤ r.
• Payment rule: pay allocated agents min(r, bM+1). No
payment to or from unallocated agents.
The period one strategic problem for an agent in the spot
auction is straightforward. An agent who has prepared, and
is now able to respond at a cost of vi has a dominant strategy
to bid b∗i = vi. What is challenging for an agent is to decide
whether or not to invest effort and prepare in period zero.
5.1 Period-Zero Preparation Decision
For simplicity, assume that every agent has the same cost of
preparation ci = c, and the same probability of being able to
respond pi = p. As earlier in the paper, we assume npM ,
so that if all agents prepare the capacity requirement will be
met with high probability.
Assume w.l.o.g. v1 ≤ · · · ≤ vn so that the agents with
lower index find it less costly to reduce demand, and de-
note pii as the probability that agent i prepares for demand
response. Let Xi be a Bernoulli random variable with proba-
bility pi (=p) and let X(m) =
∑m
i=1Xi.
Proposition 1 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in prepara-
tion). Under the spot auction with capacity M and reserve
price r, there is a pure Nash equilibrium where each agent i
prepares according to:
pi∗i =
{
1, for i ≤ mr
0, for i > mr
(6)
The threshold mr is the largest index mr = maxm∈N m s.t.
(r − vm) · p · P
[
X(m−1) ≤M − 1
]
− c ≥ 0. (7)
If there is no such agent, then mr = 0 and pi∗i = 0, ∀i.
We give the intuition for this result. First, observe that if
an agent prepares and is able to respond, the highest amount
that she can get paid is bounded by r. When mr = 0, we
have (r − v1)p − c < 0, which implies that even the lowest-
cost agent always loses in expectation by preparing and thus
pi∗i = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Assume now that mr > 0. We can check that the left
hand side of (7) is the expected utility of agent m assuming
agents i ≤ m all prepare with probability 1 and agents i >
m all prepare with probability 0. Therefore agent mr gets
non-negative utility under (6), and we can check agents i <
m get non-negative utility from preparation, and that for an
agent i > m, deviate from pi∗i and prepare would result in an
expected utility smaller than zero.
5.2 Reserve r and Reliability Target
Under the same setup as in Section 5.1, in order to meet
the reliability target τ , we need to make sure that a mini-
mum number of agents m∗ such that P
[
X(m
∗) ≥M] ≥ τ
are preparing in equilibrium. We know from (7) that this
requires (r − vm∗) · p · P
[
X(m
∗−1) ≤M − 1] − c ≥ 0
which can be rewritten as a lower bound on the reserve price
r ≥ vm∗ + c/
(
p · P [X(m∗−1) ≤M − 1]). When M is
large, P
[
X(m
∗−1) ≤M − 1] and P [X(m∗) ≤M] are close
thus the reserve price needs to be r ≈ vm∗ + c/ (p(1− τ)).
As τ becomes close to 1, the minimum reserve required to
meet the reliability target is a lot larger than both c and vi.
Remark: The only way that the spot auction can meet the
reliability target is to set a huge reserve price, which is paid
with a very small probability close to 1 − τ . Although an
equilibrium strategy exists, participation in the spot auction
is essentially a lottery for both the agent and mechanism de-
signer. Most of the time the capacity is met and the M + 1st
bid is paid, but once in 1/(1−τ) events the mechanism makes
a very large payment due to the huge reserve price. Hence,
agents must be willing to gamble by preparing for DR. More-
over, the potential high payoff (much higher than in the direct
mechanism) makes the spot auction susceptible to collusion.
6 Simulation Results
We show in this section via simulation that the direct and in-
direct mechanisms have good performance, comparing with
the best possible outcome (in a world without private infor-
mation) as well as the spot auction.
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Figure 3: Comparison between the number of selected agents
in the direct and indirect mechanisms.
Direct, Indirect Mechanisms v.s. First Best We com-
pare the number of agents selected by the direct and indirect
mechanisms with what we call the “first best,” which assumes
that the mechanism knows the types of agents and can select
agents in decreasing order of pi’s (this would not be truth-
ful). Let the total number of agents be n = 500 and the types
be iid from the distributions: vi ∼ U [0, 2], ci ∼ U [0, 2],
pi ∼ U [0, 1]. We first assume that the grid pays reward
R = 10, and would like to achieve a capacity of M = 100.
With τ varying from 0.9 to 0.999, the average number
of selected agents over 1000 economies are as shown in
Figure 3(a). The horizontal axis − log10(1 − τ) translates
τ = 0.9 to 1 and τ = 0.999 to 3. We can see that under
both the direct and indirect mechanisms, more agents are se-
lected when τ increases. Both mechanisms are doing well
comparing with the first best, and the indirect mechanism se-
lects roughly 10 more agents due to the estimation of pi’s.
Fixing τ = 0.98, the effect of varying rewardR is as shown
in Figure 3(b). The numbers of selected agents decrease in
both mechanisms as R increases, since with higher R, the
willingness to pay zi’s are more aligned with the reliability
pi so the mechanisms are effectively selecting agents that are
more reliable. For the indirect mechanism, increasing R also
improves the inference on pi and we see an additional signif-
icant drop in the number of selected agents.
As the reward R increases, both the reward and the penalty
increase, however the increase in total paid rewards outweigh
the additional penalty collected. The effect is that the total
(expected) cost increases as the reward R increases (figure
not included due to space limit). The cost under the indirect
mechanism is typically 5% to 10% (depending on R) larger
since more agents are selected.
Direct Mechanism v.s. Spot Auction. Consider a fixed
economy with n = 1000 agents, each of whom has the same
pi = 0.8 and ci = 2. Assume that vi = i/100, so that the
agents with lower index find it less costly to reduce demand.
For comparison between the direct mechanism and the spot
auction, we set the reward R and reserve r (in the direct and
spot, respectively) to be the minimum values such that a mini-
mum number of agents (denotedm∗) prepares thusM = 100
units are guaranteed with probability τ . For the direct mech-
anism, R needs to be large enough such that m∗ agents have
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Figure 4: Comparison between the average and std. dev. of
total cost to the mechanism under the direct mechanism and
spot auction.
non-negative zero crossings, and for the spot auction r needs
to incentivize m∗ agents to prepare in equilibrium.
The mean and standard deviation (std) of the total costs (re-
ward payments minus collected penalties for the direct mech-
anism) computed over 1 million economies are shown in Fig-
ure 4. The total cost under the direct mechanism is lower than
that of spot auction, moreover, the std of the total costs under
the spot auction is extremely high.
This is because under the spot auction, the total cost are
low most of the times (when the M+1th bid is paid), how-
ever, with probability close to 1− τ the huge reserve price is
paid, and this results in a huge variance in the total payments.
Given the high variability of the payment (and the high payoff
from colluding), we conclude a spot auction is less practical
than the two-period mechanisms.
7 Conclusions
We studied the problem of incentivizing truthfulness when
selecting from a number of unrealiable providers in demand
response. We introduce two new, dominant-strategy equi-
librium mechanisms. The mechanisms are almost first-best
in their ability to select a small number of reliable agents,
and achieve lower payments and lower variance in payments
than the spot auction. In future work, we plan to understand
whether it is possible to meet the reduction target with high
probability without reducing beyond the target and while re-
taining dominant-strategy equilibrium. Another interesting
direction is to consider agents for whom the probability of
responding is a function of the effort invested in preparation.
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